The paper develops a model in which a country with better technology for abatement of Green House Gas (GHG) emission (the North) commits to an international protocol to keep the global GHG emission within a specified limit while it helps the mitigation effort in the other country (the South) with unconditional transfer of abatement technology. It finds out in the autarkic ('no trade') equilibrium the technology transfer offer from the North is always accepted by the South. The North may offer either a partial or a complete technology transfer. If partial technology transfer is offered it finds out the determinants of the extent of technology transfer. Then it compares the autarkic equilibrium with equilibrium where trade with complete specialization occurs and finds out that trade limits the scope of technology transfer as an instrument for mitigation of global GHG emission.
Introduction
Keeping global pollution within the limit has recently been a major cause of concern around the world. Global pollution is a public 'bad', which adversely affects all the countries around the world through incidents like global climate change with grave implications for their economies. So, the countries have been deliberating among themselves for quite sometimes now on the way to reduce the global pollution to prevent global climate change. The Kyoto protocol had been a landmark agreement in this initiative. The Protocol sets distinct GHG emission targets and tries -by means of its flexible mechanisms -to distribute the burden of GHG emission mitigation more equitably and efficiently among countries. The countries in the North with the history of high emissions along with high national income and high rank in the Human Development Index (HDI) are slated to make commitments to stabilize the global pollution at a particular level. The North can fulfil its commitment either by controlling its own emission level or by helping mitigation in the South. It is argued that transfers from the North to the South, which target mitigation serves the objective of equity as the transfer flows from the rich countries to the poor countries. It also serves the objective of efficiency. Since the south possesses relatively inefficient technology for abatement and the North is already in possession of a better technology for abatement, the North can abate relatively less on its own without sacrificing its production by exploiting cheaper abatement options in the South 2 . The Climate Convention also stresses on transfer from the North to the South to help the South to adapt with the reality of climate change. As a part of the adaptation funding, 3 a significant amount has already been spent in countries like India and China to make them aware of the danger of climate change. Consequently, though the countries in the South did not make any formal commitment in Kyoto, they have also joined the global effort in the GHG emission reduction by design of suitable regulations to control GHG emission and by formation of institutions like Pollution Control Boards.
Transfers from the North to the South play a major role in the global effort in GHG emission reduction. Transfers can take different forms: it can either be a financial transfer or a technology transfer. Schelling (1991) Specifically, we explore the determinants of the extent of technology transfer where the North makes a commitment to stabilize the global GHG emission to a limit and South does not make any such explicit commitment. Then, we also ask the question if the trade in commodities restricts the role of technology transfer.
We construct a theoretical framework in this paper where first we consider the no-trade ("autarkic") situation and then we consider the trade in commodities, in which the country with better abatement technology (the North) specializes in production of the non-polluting commodity and the other country (the South) specializes in the production of the polluting commodity. We find in trade situation, there is a possibility that the North refuses to transfer its better technology at all as it fears an increase in global GHG emission as a result of the transfer.
However, if it decides to transfer, it transfers the complete technology. This is unlike the autarkic situation in which it is always inclined to transfer the technology.
However, in autarky it may decide to transfer only a part of its technology or an old (1996) , Scheffran and Pickl (2000) that deal with the issue of technology transfer from the North to the South, but they do not consider the commitment on the part of the North in keeping the GHG emission within a limit. They do not discuss the commodity trade equilibrium either. The paper by Yang (1999) is very close to our framework. Although it considers the mitigation effect of the technology transfer in the South, as it ignores the adaptation exercise in the South, it ignores an important effect generated by the transfer of abatement technology in the South i.e. the expansion of the polluting industry. This affects the results of the paper. We correct for this omission in our paper. Yang (1999) also does not consider the trade situation.
There are papers in the trade theory which deal with trade and environment 5 . Copeland and Taylor (2005) analyze in a trading world the effects of commitment on the part of the North on global pollution level. It also discusses the effects of the pollution permit trading among the countries in the North on the same. It shows the conventional wisdom that existed in the context of the autarkic equilibrium change considerably as the possibility of trade is taken into account. But, though it considers trade flows between the countries, it does not consider any kind of transfer from the North to South as we do in this paper. Another set of papers in the literature restrict 5 See Copeland and Taylor (2004) for a recent review.
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themselves to the issue of technology transfer and trade; they do not deal with the issue of GHG emission. In particular, Beladi, Jones and Marjit (1997) use a very similar model as we develop in this paper. However, they find no conflict between technology transfer and commodity trade. In contrast to them, in our paper as we take into account the issue of the GHG emission we find out trade may restrict the scope of technology transfer. Therefore, this paper explores a new area in economic research and also makes important contribution in terms of the results it generates.
In the next section of the paper we lay out the model. The two subsections in it consider the "autarkic" and "trade" situations. The section following concludes.
The Model

Autarky
We consider two countries the North and the South. The North is denoted as the i th country and the South is denoted as the j th country. Both the countries have labor as their only factor of production. The endowments of labor in the North and the South are identical, given by L. The countries produce and consume two commodities 1 and 2, the amounts of which are denoted by q 1 and q 2 . The commodity 1 does not have any pollution component associated with its production. However, commodity 2 is an "impure public good" that emits CO 2 in the production process that adversely affects global climate. In particular we assume 1 unit production of commodity 2 emits one unit of CO 2 . The global climate change has a negative impact on the enjoyment of private utility (from the consumption of the commodities) in each of these countries.
Therefore, each country tries to abate the pollution generated in her. But, the abatement technology has a limitation. It can abate only ψ fraction of the 1 unit of CO 2 emitted in the production process. Therefore, it emits φ = 1 -ψ units of CO 2 per unit of production of commodity 2.
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The countries differ in terms of their abatement technologies in the following way.
Suppose, the amount of labor required to abate ψ units of CO 2 is given by 6 a ψ . We assume the North possesses more efficient technology for abatement than the South in the sense that ψ i > ψ j and a ψi ψ i < a ψj ψ j . The fractions, φ i and φ j denote per unit emissions from the countries.
The countries have identical preferences. The utility function of the North is given by:
and the utility function of the South is given by:
where u 1 > 0, u 2 -(φ i q 2i + φ j q 2j ) φ i > 0, u 2 -(φ i q 2i + φ j q 2j ) φ j > 0, u 11 < 0, u 22 < 0, u 12 = u 21 = 0.
The countries have C.R.S technology in production of both the commodities. The production of 1 unit of commodity 1 in the North and the South requires respectively a 1i and a 1j units of labor. Similarly, the production of commodity 2 in them requires respectively a 2i and a 2j units of labor. We assume, a 1i < a 1j and a 2i < a 2j so that the North has absolute advantage in production of both the commodities. Since the countries internalize a part of the pollution cost associated with the production of commodity 2 through the costly abatement activity, its actual labor cost of production in the North and the South turns out to be 7 (a 2i + a ψi ψ i ) and (a 2j + a ψj ψ j ) respectively. Therefore, the production possibility frontier of the North can be written as:
Similarly, the production possibility frontier of the South can be written as:
6 Such numbers reflect a mixture of technical knowledge (blueprints), climate and labor skills. In the question of technology transfer we consider reasonably only the transfer of the blueprint as in Beladi, Jones and Marjit (1997) . 7 In our model we assume a ψi and a ψj as parameters. The governments in individual countries being aware of the danger of GHG emission try their best to internalize the social cost of the emission from their own countries. There are papers in the literature, which treat them as strategic variables with the countries. See for examples the papers by Barrett (1994) .
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We also assume, the South has comparative advantage in production of commodity 2, which implies:
Observe, the countries have strategic interdependence in their choice of q 2i and q 2j . So it must be the case that at least a Nash equilibrium exists in this game. Suppose, the unique Nash equilibrium of the game is given by (q 2i * > 0, q 2j * > 0). Then it must satisfy the following pair of equations:
While equation (6) represents the reaction function of the North, equation (7) represents the reaction function of the South. The equilibrium consumption of commodity 1 in the two countries q 1i * and q 1j * are determined from equations (3) and
. We also check that at (q 2i * > 0, q 2j * > 0) the second order condition for utility maximization is satisfied for each of the countries. The stability condition for the Nash equilibrium is also satisfied. The global pollution level at the Nash equilibrium is given by:
Observe, at the equilibrium q 2i * > q 2j *. This must be true because owing to the assumption φ i < φ j the marginal cost of production of q 2i in the North which is given by (φ i q 2i + φ j q 2j ) φ i is strictly less than the marginal cost of production of q 2j in the South given by (φ i q 2i + φ j q 2j ) φ j . Now, suppose the North with its better technology of abatement commits to an international agreement by which it contemplates transferring its technology for abatement to the South in order to restrict the global pollution level within the current limit. The South, which receives the technology, does not commit to any output 8 restriction. We assume, the North can choose to transfer γ ∈[ represents a general case. We also assume, the technology is transferred free of cost.
However, as the better abatement technology is transferred from the North to the South, the South's reaction to the North's pollution level changes that results in a change in the initial Nash equilibrium. The global pollution level also changes. Then, in this situation the North's commitment to the abovementioned international protocol would imply, it would choose its output level in such a way that at the new equilibrium (q 2i ′, q 2j ′) the following constraint holds:
As the North commits to technology transfer as well as to the above-mentioned international protocol the nature of the game played between the countries takes the form given below:
The North chooses The South observes (q 2i ′, γ*) Payoffs (q 2i ′, γ*) and chooses q 2j ′ are realized.
Observe, in this situation q 2j ′ depends on the choice of (q 2i ′, γ*) by the North. On the other hand the choice of (q 2i ′, γ*) depends on the way it affects q 2j ′. We solve the game applying the method of backward induction. So, we first look at the reaction of the South to the change in the values of q 2i ′ and γ*.
Proof: See the appendix.
The North internalizes the behavior of the South as given by lemma 1 and 2 in its choice of (q 1i ′, q 2i ′, γ*). The North solves the following problem: it maximizes,
by choosing (q 1i ′, q 2i ′, γ*) subject to the constraints given by equation (3), inequality (9), and the lemmas 1 and 2. Substituting q 1i ′ from equation (3) into equation (10) the problem can be rewritten as: maximization of
by the choice of (q 2i ′ > 0, γ* > 0) subject to the constraints: 
As the North transfers the better technology of abatement to the South, the source of its benefit lies in the consequent reduction of the global pollution level. If the South receives the better technology its cost of abatement (and therefore the cost of production) falls. As a result the production of the polluting commodity in the South rises. Because of this, a possibility occurs such that the global pollution level increases as a whole with a threat of reducing welfare of country i, which has originally transferred the technology. However, if γ* = ) 1 ( ε ψ ε + i , even if its production of the polluting commodity rises the South's contribution to the global pollution level remains unchanged. In this situation, depending on its preference for commodity 2 the North either can choose its output in such a way that the global pollution falls below the limit R , which is the current pollution level or it can choose to maintain the pollution level at R . On the other hand, if ε >
, as the technology is transferred the South emits more pollution in the air so that the global pollution level rises. Therefore, the North not only transfers its complete abatement technology but also reduces its own output of the polluting commodity to such an extent that the global pollution at the equilibrium falls below the limit R .
In the next proposition we calculate the determinants of extent of technology transfer in the case of partial technology transfer is offered.
Proposition 2: If the North offers partial technology transfer, as ψ i rises the extent of technology transfer falls. As ε rises the extent of technology transfer rises.
Proof: See the appendix. Proof: See the appendix.
As the technology transfer is offered by the North, the South gains on two counts. First, as proposition 1 suggests, the global pollution level either falls or remains the same. Second, as the better abatement technology is transferred it produces more of the polluting commodity (from lemma 2). Since, as we assume in this paper there is a net gain in utility associated with production of commodity 2, the overall utility level of the country rises at the equilibrium. Therefore, proposition 1 and 3 together suggest whenever the North offers a technology transfer, the South readily accepts it. Now, we consider the cases where at the initial equilibrium trade is opened up between the countries.
Trade: Complete specialization
We consider the countries are small enough and competitive in the world commodity markets for both the commodities. We denote the international terms of trade (5) above), as in the Ricardian models of trade, country 1 completely specializes in production of commodity 1 and country 2 completely specializes in production of commodity 2. It follows from equations (3) and (4) 
Similarly, the consumption equilibrium at the South, ( , ) must satisfy the budget equation of the South:
We assume both the commodities are normal commodities in terms of their consumption. It follows: dp q d i 2 < 0 and dp q d j 2 < 0. As the trade opens up and both countries gain in terms of real income, it must also be true that > q i q 2 2i * and > q j q 2 2j *.
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The world market for commodity 2 must satisfy the following market clearing condition:
which determines the international terms of trade p.
Since, now only the South produces the commodity emitting CO 2 in its production the global pollution level is given by:
How does R compare with R ?
Lemma 3: R > R .
, using equation (16) into equation (17) we have:
Since > q i q 2 2i *, > q j q 2 2j * and φ i < φ j the following must be true:
Therefore, from equations (8) and (18) the statement of the lemma follows.
Since, now the North does not produce the polluting commodity, the commitment of the North to the international protocol to keep the global pollution level within R translates into the North's commitment to transfer the better abatement technology in such a way that the global pollution level remains within the limit. Now, the North chooses γ in an attempt to implement the following condition:
Observe, since with trade and therefore unlike in the autarkic situation the North no longer produces the polluting commodity now it has only one instrument i.e. the choice of γ to implement the global pollution commitment given by equation (19).
Here we are interested to know the choice of γ by the North. But, since it commits to satisfy equation (19) before making its choice it would like to know the way the South would like to react to its choice of γ. We denote the choice of γ by the North as γ . Unlike the autarkic situation here, as γ changes the international terms of trade ~~ p changes. We call this 'terms-of-trade' effect. While taking its decision about of γ , the North also takes into account of the 'terms of trade' effect. γ d dp Lemma 4: γ d dp < 0.
Proof: As the technology transfer takes place equation (16) can be written as:
From equation (15):
Since by assumption γ βd d j < 0 and the commodities are the normal commodities, < 0. 
Since, by assumption γ βd
Now, in view of the three lemmas derived above we look at the choice of γ by the North. We also derive the condition under which the technology transfer offer is accepted by the South. We state the results in the following proposition of the model.
~
As we state the proposition we use the following definitions: η = γ d dp p γ and ξ = γ d dR R γ .
Proposition 4: The North refrains from technology transfer (chooses
γ = ~i j ψ ψ ) if ε ≥ j j ψ ψ − 1 . If 1 1 u [ j q p R 2 2 ξ - j j j2 2 2 ) ( − η] < ε < j j ψ ψ − 1 ,
the North offers complete technology transfer (chooses = 1) and the South accepts it. γ
Proof:
Observe, compared to the autarkic situation now there is a possibility that the North refrains from technology transfer to the South. It does so if it contemplates that technology transfer is going to raise the global pollution level further. However, if it decides to transfer the technology at all, it opts for complete technology transfer. In the autarkic situation there is a possibility that the North goes for partial technology transfer, which vanishes with the trade situation. In the autarkic situation the South used to always gain from the technology transfer. So, whenever there was a technology transfer offer from the North, the South used to accept it. With trade this result changes. Now although the South benefits with the technology transfer as its production expands and the global pollution falls, but it loses as the international terms of trade moves against it. If ε is too low the 'terms of trade' effect dominates the other beneficial effects. Therefore, it refrains from accepting the technology transfer offer. Also observe, since in trade situation the North has one instrument less to commit to the global pollution constraint compared to the autarkic situation (it can choose only the extent of technology transfer, not the output of the polluting commodity), with trade there is no guarantee that the technology transfer can achieve the global pollution constraint given by equation (19) . Unlike in the autarkic situation, despite technology transfer it may happen that the global pollution level exceeds R .
Conclusions
The In this model we assume the country with better abatement technology also has a better production technology. The better abatement technology is not only able to abate more but also operates at lower cost. We think this assumption is realistic. The model also assumes a particular pattern of comparative advantage between the countries, which we again feel is realistic. The trade is modelled as a Ricardian model because that best captures the issue of technology transfer.
Therefore, it uses only one factor of production, which is immobile between the countries. So, it fails to capture the effect of factor mobility between the countries on the equilibrium. The assumption of complete specialization in production is another limiting assumption of the model. If we allow for incomplete specialization in the country with better technology it is possible that the trade equilibrium can yield similar features as the autarkic equilibrium. In the model, we have assumed the technology transfer is free. Relaxing the assumption of free technology transfer eases the burden of fulfilling the commitment on the North, but it accentuates the possibility that there is no agreement between the countries on technology transfer and the effort to limit the global pollution suffers a setback. In this paper we have assumed the technology transfer takes place in a traded commodity. A possible extension of the paper can be introduction of a non-traded commodity (like power) in this model when the technology is transferred in this non-traded industry. However, our guess is that this new possibility, though interesting, is expected to yield similar results as in the current paper. Another interesting extension of this paper would be the introduction of strategic trade instead of the trade based on perfect competition.
Here, we have not discussed if the transfer of abatement technology is the optimum strategy available for countries with better technology to keep the global pollution level within the limit. There could be other options like a transfer of the production technology or a combination of the abatement and the production technologies. We have not explored the possible answer to this question in this paper.
So, the paper brings out many interesting possibilities of research.
Checking for these unexplored possibilities remain as our future research agenda.
Proof of lemma 1. If φ i q 2i ′ + (1 -γ*ψ i ) q 2j ′ = R , at (q 1j ′, q 2j ′) the objective function of the South as given in equation (2) can be written as:
From equation (4) it follows:
where β j is the new labor requirement in the South for the amount of abatement associated with per unit of production of commodity 2; a ψj ψ j ≤ β j ≤ a ψi ψ i and γ β
Substituting the value of q 1j ′ from equation (11) If φ i q 2i ′ + (1 -γ*ψ i ) q 2j ′ < R , at (q 1j ′, q 2j ′) the objective function of the South as given in equation (2) can be written as:
Substituting q 1j ′ from equation (2a) into equation (4a) and maximizing with respect to q 2j ′, we find q 2j ′ > 0 must satisfy the following first order condition for maximization:
From (5a) we find: 
The numerator of the term on the R.H.S of equation (7a) is negative as u 1 > 0, * γ β d d j < 0 and u 11 < 0. The denominator is also negative by the second order condition of maximization, which is satisfied due to the assumptions u 11 < 0, u 22 < 0. Therefore,
If Proof of Proposition 1. Given the North's problem described above we can write the corresponding Lagrange function for optimization as:
which is maximized with respect to (q 2i ′ > 0, γ* > 0, λ 1 * ≥ 0, λ 2 * ≥ 0 , λ 3 * ≥ 0) where λ 1 , λ 2 and λ 3 are Lagrange multipliers.
From equation (9a) we derive: Then, complementary slackness implies it must be the case that λ 1 * = λ 2 * = λ 3 * = 0.
This implies from equations (10a) and (11a) at (q 2i ′ > 0, γ* > 0) the following equations must be satisfied:
From the assumptions of the model, equation (15a) Then, complementary slackness implies it must be the case that λ 1 * > 0 and λ 2 * = λ 3 * = 0.
We also know from lemma 1, ′ ∂ ′ ∂ Then, complementary slackness implies it must be the case that λ 1 * > 0 and λ 2 * > 0 and λ 3 * = 0.
We also know from lemma 1, ′ ∂ ′ ∂ 
Equation (17a) Here, the conditions for constraint qualifications are: Then, complementary slackness implies it must be the case that λ 1 * > 0 and λ 2 * = 0 and λ 3 * > 0.
We also know from lemma 1,
These imply from equations (10a) and (11a) at (q 2i ′ > 0, γ* > 0) the following equations must be satisfied:
Equation ( Here, the conditions for constraint qualifications are: Then, complementary slackness implies it must be the case that λ 1 * = 0 and λ 2 * > 0 and λ 3 * = 0.
Equation ( Here, the condition for constraint qualification is: dγ ≤ 0, which holds at (q 2j ′ > 0, γ* = 1).
Case 6: We assume, Then, complementary slackness implies it must be the case that λ 1 * = λ 2 * = 0 and λ 3 * > 0.
This implies from equations (10a) and (11a) 
On the other hand,
